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The Making of California’s Art Recovery
Statute: The Long Road to Section 338(c)(3)
Rajika L. Shah*
In 2015, the Western Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic
Church of America reached an historic, amicable settlement with
the J. Paul Getty Museum regarding ownership and possession of
eight valuable illuminated manuscript pages that had been
secretly cut out of a medieval Armenian Gospel book during the
Armenian genocide in 1915–1923. The pages resurfaced decades
later in the Getty museum’s collection in Southern California. The
Church’s suit was brought under a novel California statute, Code
of Civil Procedure section 338(c)(3), that extended the statute of
limitations for certain claims to fine art stolen or unlawfully
taken. This statute of neutral applicability was the product of
many years of attempts by the California legislature to provide a
forum for certain categories of plaintiff victim residents, most
notably Holocaust and Armenian genocide survivors and their
heirs. After federal courts struck down a series of special statutes
on foreign affairs preemption grounds, section 338(c)(3) was
finally deemed to pass constitutional muster. It has now served as
the template for Congressional legislation in the 2016 Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act, a statute explicitly designed to
further U.S. policy with respect to Nazi-looted art. This article
explores the long road to section 338(c)(3) and how it may point
the way forward for future action.

* Adjunct Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law,
California; LL.M. (with Distinction) in Public International Law, London School of
Economics and Political Science. The author has been in private practice in California
focusing almost exclusively on complex international disputes involving multinational
corporations, foreign sovereigns, and claims before the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission. In the interest of full disclosure, the author has acted as counsel to plaintiffs
in some of the Armenian genocide-era suits discussed in this article. She expresses her
thanks to K. Lee Boyd and Kristen Nelson, plaintiffs’ co-counsel in these suits, and to
Michael Bazyler.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2015, the Western Prelacy of the Armenian
Apostolic Church of America reached an historic, amicable
settlement with the J. Paul Getty Museum, in which the Getty
acknowledged the church’s ownership of eight thirteenth century
illustrated manuscript pages (called Canon Tables) from the
Zeyt’un Gospels, by T’oros Roslin (Armenian, active 1256–1268),
which were allegedly stolen in the early twentieth century during
the Armenian genocide and have been in the Getty’s collection
since the mid-1990s.1 Separately, in recognition of the Getty’s
decades-long stewardship of the Canon Tables and its deep
understanding and appreciation of Armenian art, the Church
donated the pages to the Getty Museum in order to ensure
their preservation and widespread exhibition.2 This remarkable
settlement, in the first successful Armenian genocide-related art
recovery case, followed years of legal battle between the parties.
One of the most interesting features of the Getty case is that
it was litigated under California Code of Civil Procedure section
338(c)(3), a 2010 statute that extends the limitations period on
claims for the recovery of stolen or unlawfully taken art. Under
the statute, the limitations period on such claims does not
begin to run until the date of actual discovery of (i) the identity
and whereabouts of the artwork, and (ii) facts sufficient to
establish that the claimant has a claim for a possessory interest
in the artwork. 3
The Getty case illustrates well how section 338(c)(3),
although neutral in its applicability, empowers in particular
human rights plaintiffs, who often need years of research in
order to establish the facts required to start the limitations
clock ticking on their recovery claims. It also puts museums,
art dealers, and auction houses on notice that they may face
valid claims for the recovery of stolen art long after their
initial acquisition.
That section 338(c)(3) can be used to recover art taken
during mass atrocities, such as genocide, is no coincidence. In
fact, it follows a long line of attempts by the California
legislature to provide redress and a forum for its citizens and
residents to bring claims for the recovery of property taken

1 See Press Release, J. Paul Getty Museum, J. Paul Getty Museum and the Western
Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church of America Announce Agreement in Armenian
Art Restitution Case (Sept. 21, 2015), http://news.getty.edu/images/9036/manuscript2015
release.pdf [hereinafter Getty Press Release] [http://perma.cc/BJ2A-42G5].
2 See id.
3 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3) (West 2010).
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during mass atrocities, by passing a variety of state statutes
designed to assist particular victim groups whose claims
would otherwise have been time-barred. Those statutes were
consistently struck down by federal courts on various
constitutional grounds. Section 338(c)(3) is the first one that
passed constitutional muster, and is thus both a milestone and a
blueprint for future statutes.
This article will examine the long road to section 338(c)(3)
and the Getty case in light of other, less successful, Holocaust
and mass atrocities cases and statutes. Section II will discuss the
context in which the Getty case and section 338(c)(3) arose,
including the Holocaust restitution movement and how it gave
birth to Armenian genocide restitution litigation. Section III will
explore the back-and-forth conversation between the California
legislature and the judiciary regarding the constitutional limits
of state action as it played out in Holocaust art recovery and
Armenian genocide litigation. Section IV will focus on the Getty
case and section 338(c)(3) in detail, while section V will explore
possibilities for future art recovery litigation, including the newly
enacted federal Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act
(“HEAR Act”).
II. THE RISE OF MODERN HOLOCAUST AND MASS ATROCITIES
RESTITUTION EFFORTS
A. Why Property Restitution Matters
Victims of genocide and other mass atrocities indisputably
have individual claims under both international law and
domestic law for their own personal injuries and for the loss of
the lives of their loved ones. However, they also have claims for
the property losses that typically accompany the atrocities.
These property losses can run from the mundane, such as
household items, to valuable assets including insurance policies,
bank accounts, or safe deposit boxes. Real estate losses can also
be devastating, and may be the most difficult on which to recover
if there are subsequent inhabitants or the state has taken over
the property. Whatever they consist of, such property losses
deprive the victims of not only their physical assets, but also an
essential sense of identity and self.4
There are strong arguments that even the destruction of a
group’s culture—for example, the suppression of a minority
4 See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW: A QUEST FOR
JUSTICE IN A POST-HOLOCAUST WORLD 153–55 (2016) [hereinafter HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE,
AND THE LAW].
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group’s language, religion, and social habits—constitutes a form
of genocide.5 For example, a plausible argument can be made
that a cultural genocide occurred in the case of China’s
decades-long suppression of Tibetan culture and religion;
Turkey’s suppression of Kurdish culture, including a ban on the
use of the Kurdish language; and the forced assimilation of
Aboriginal indigenous people in Australia and Native Americans
in North America.6
Art, and other cultural or religious property that can be
viewed as art, sits at the intersection of these two ideas. Objects
that are explicitly created as artworks (such as paintings), and
those that can be seen as an artistic expression of religious,
philosophical, historical, or other significance (such as objects
found at places of worship) are valuable not only because of the
high prices they can command, but because they help to define
the character of a people and their traditions. It is no surprise,
then, that many of the recent lawsuits brought by victims of
mass atrocities seek compensation for the loss of stolen art. The
most famous of these cases is Altmann v. Republic of Austria,7 a
case that went all the way to the United States Supreme Court
and was dramatized in the 2015 feature film, “Woman in Gold,”
but there have been several others.8
In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recognized the centrality of property takings in the
commission of genocide when it explicitly held that property
takings themselves—apart from any murders—constitute a form
of genocide.9 In Simon v. Hungary, fourteen elderly Holocaust
survivors originally from Hungary sued the Republic of Hungary
and its state-owned Hungarian railway for having collaborated
with the German Nazis in 1944–45, during the waning months of
World War II, to perpetuate the deportation and extermination of
nearly half a million Hungarian Jews.10
Because the plaintiffs sued Hungary and a Hungarian state
agency, jurisdiction over the defendants was governed exclusively

See id. at 47–48.
See id. at 48.
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2010); Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 702 F.3d (2d Cir. 2012); Malewicz v.
City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D.D.C. 2007); Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No.
06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007); Toledo Museum of Art v.
Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
9 Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
10 Id. at 134. The Simon plaintiffs brought causes of action for property loss,
including conversion and unjust enrichment, as well as personal injury and international
law claims.
5
6
7
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by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).11 Unless one
of the enumerated exceptions was met, the general rule applied
and the foreign sovereign and the state railway would be immune
from suit in U.S. courts.12 The relevant exception in Simon,
commonly known as the “takings” or “expropriation exception,”
holds that a foreign sovereign and its related entities are not
immune from suit in U.S. courts if “[1] rights in property [2] taken
in violation of international law are in issue and [3] that property
or any property exchanged for such property is present in the
United States” in connection with a specified commercial activity
with a U.S. nexus.13
The Simon plaintiffs’ property-related claims for conversion
and unjust enrichment satisfied the first element of the
exception, and the state-owned railway did not dispute that it
engaged in the requisite U.S.-based commercial activity.14 Thus,
the key issue in Simon was whether plaintiffs’ property had been
“taken in violation of international law.” Because there was no
dispute that genocide itself violated international law, the court
began its analysis by determining whether the alleged property
takings “[bore] a sufficient connection to genocide that they
amount to takings in violation of international law.”15
The Simon plaintiffs alleged a three-step governmental
policy designed to inflict maximum destruction, carried out in the
space of just three months. First, Hungarian Jews were targeted
in a persecution campaign that included travel and certain
clothing bans, bans from eating in restaurants or using public
pools, and the requirement that every Jew wear the yellow Star
of David.16 Second, Jews were forced into cramped, unsanitary
ghettos, and had their clothing removed. All of their property was
systematically inventoried and confiscated by Hungarian officials
going door to door.17 Third and finally, Jews were rounded up and
marched to the railways, all their remaining belongings
confiscated, and they were transported to Nazi death camps
(primarily Auschwitz-Birkenau in German-occupied Poland)
under the direction of Nazi mastermind Adolf Eichmann,
where they were virtually all murdered upon arrival. 18 As this
11 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)
(stating that the FSIA is “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
our courts”).
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
14 Simon, 812 F.3d at 142, 147.
15 Id. at 142–43.
16 Id. at 133.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 133–34.
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description makes clear, widespread property confiscation was
not merely incidental to the extermination of Hungarian Jews, it
was part and parcel of an integrated plan to destroy the group,
its way of life, and its culture.19
As the D.C. Circuit saw it, “the pivotal acts constituting
genocide” that occurred in Simon “are those set out in subsection
(c) of the definition” of genocide as found in the Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(“Genocide Convention”), adopted by the United Nations in 1948
and entered into force in 1951.20 In other words, the property
takings alleged by plaintiffs were intended to “deliberately inflict
[] on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part,” which was the very
reason such language was included in the definition of genocide.21
The court’s view on this point was unambiguous: the
property taken from Hungary’s Jews did more than “finance
Hungary’s war effort” and was not merely incident to the
ghettoization of the Hungarian Jews.22 Rather, the “systematic,
‘wholesale plunder of Jewish property’” by Hungarian and
German authorities was intended to deprive Jews of the
resources they needed to survive as a people; the property was
taken for the very purpose of ensuring the destruction of
Hungary’s Jews.23 As a result, the international law violation
required to establish the court’s jurisdiction under the FSIA’s
takings exception was not the uncompensated expropriations
themselves, but rather genocide.24
In agreeing with the plaintiffs, the Simon court confirmed
and further articulated the conclusion reached by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals four years earlier in another case
Id. at 134.
Id. at 143. The Genocide Convention set forth for the first time a legal definition of
genocide and criminalized genocidal activity, whether committed in peacetime or during
war. Article II of the Convention defines genocide as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, Dec. 9,
1948, C.P.P.C.G. No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
21 Simon, 812 F.3d at 143.
22 Id.
23 Id. (some internal formatting omitted).
24 Id. at 145.
19
20
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involving the theft of property of Hungarian Jews during the
Second World War.25 In Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the
federal appellate court explained that acts of thievery such as
“the freezing of bank accounts, the [establishment of] straw-man
control of corporations, the looting of safe deposit boxes and
suitcases brought . . . to the train stations, and even charging
third-class train fares to victims being sent to death camps” is
both a “ghoulishly efficient” means of financing the rounding up
and deportation or incarceration of the targeted group, and an
“integral part” of the genocide itself.26
These conclusions comport with victims’ sense of why property
takings are at the core of genocidal activity, and place property
claims at the heart of any effort to restore victims to wholeness.
B. U.S. Courts as the Modern Forum for Victims’ Property
Restitution Litigation
Victims of mass atrocities are often unable, for a variety of
reasons, to make claims for stolen property until long after the
events occurred. They typically suffer from extreme psychological
distress, displacement, loss of multiple family members, and loss
of supporting documentation. They may not wish to think or talk
about the stolen property because it reminds them of the horrors
they witnessed, and they may not be aware of a forum in which
to assert their claims. When all of these factors combine, it may
be decades or generations later before they and their heirs realize
a claim may be made.
In addition, a variety of defendants may be liable for property
losses, depending on what was taken and the circumstances. The
claims may be directed at both state and non-state actors,
including: (1) those who directly perpetrated the genocide or
mass atrocity; (2) those who aided and abetted, or facilitated the
See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 675. As fully stated by the court:
Genocide, the complaints here clearly imply, can be an expensive proposition.
Expropriating property from the targets of genocide has the ghoulishly efficient
result of both paying for the costs associated with a systematic attempt to
murder an entire people and leaving destitute any who manage to survive. The
expropriations alleged by plaintiffs in these cases -- the freezing of bank
accounts, the straw-man control of corporations, the looting of safe deposit
boxes and suitcases brought by Jews to the train stations, and even charging
third-class train fares to victims being sent to death camps -- should be viewed,
at least on the pleadings, as an integral part of the genocidal plan to
depopulate Hungary of its Jews. The expropriations thus effectuated genocide
in two ways. They funded the transport and murder of Hungarian Jews, and
they impoverished those who survived, depriving them of the financial means
to reconstitute their lives and former communities.

25
26

Id.
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genocide or atrocity in some way; and (3) those who took no direct
or indirect participation in the genocide or atrocity, but
nevertheless benefited from it by virtue of having received,
purchased, or come into possession of property taken during the
genocide or atrocity.27
Beginning in the 1990s, momentum built for a wave of
litigation in U.S. courts in order to tackle the “unfinished
business” of the Holocaust by seeking to hold accountable private
actors and state agencies for the benefits they received as a
result of Nazi persecution.28 This included suits seeking
restitution of unreturned bank deposits, unpaid insurance
policies taken out by Holocaust victims, and looted art,29 as well
as suits seeking compensation from banks that had traded in
looted assets and industrial companies that had benefited from
Nazi victim slave labor.30
Several factors made United States courts the most
attractive forum for these suits, including the ability of U.S.
courts to recognize jurisdiction over defendants that do business
in the United States, even over claims that occurred abroad; the
ability of lawyers to take cases on a contingency basis, thereby
giving Holocaust claimants top-notch legal representation when
filing suits against European and American corporate giants; and
a legal culture in which lawyers are willing to take high-risk
cases with a low probability of success in order to test the limits
of the law.31 Equally important to the positive outcome of the
modern push for Holocaust restitution were the commitment and
willingness of American public officials to shine a spotlight on the
mass theft of Jewish property and broker settlement agreements,
the effective advocacy of U.S.-based Jewish community
organizations, and American media interest in Nazi reparations.32
27 See themes discussed in Michael J. Bazyler, From “Lamentation and Liturgy to
Litigation”: The Holocaust-Era Restitution Movement as a Model for Bringing Armenian
Genocide-Era Restitution Suits, in American Courts, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 245 (2011)
[hereinafter Lamentation and Liturgy].
28 See HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 161. This has been
called the “third period” of Holocaust restitution efforts. Id. at 155. In the first period,
immediately following the Second World War, the Allied countries focused on recovering
and returning assets stolen by the Nazis throughout Europe, including but not limited to
Jewish property. Id. at 155–57. These efforts were only partly successful, and were
complicated by the later communist property takings in countries of the Soviet eastern
bloc. Id. The second period was marked by a 1952 agreement between Germany and
Israel in which Germany agreed to make payments to the new state of Israel over the
following decade, and to individual Holocaust survivors for the duration of their lives. Id.
at 158–61.
29 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
30 See HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, supra note 4 at 161.
31 Id. at 161–62.
32 Id. at 162; see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 403–06 (2003)
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These remarkable efforts led to compensation totaling more
than $8 billion in individual and community-based payments,
with significant European and American government
cooperation.33 Many suits ended in outright dismissal on
technical grounds including statute of limitations, political
question, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and forum non
conveniens. No case ever went to trial. And yet, Germany and its
corporations realized that, even if they succeeded in getting a
particular lawsuit (most filed as class actions) dismissed, they
would still face a political and public relations problem that
would not go away. Victims’ advocates were able to exert
settlement pressure on them by reminding the American public
“that the German products they were buying—whether cars,
computers, aspirin, or insurance—were from the same companies
that were implicated in some of the most horrific crimes
committed in human history.”34
Moreover, the lawsuits spurred many companies—both
European and American—to review their archives and official
histories in light of allegations of Nazi complicity, and in some
cases even issue apologies.35
The success of the modern Holocaust restitution movement
led other victim groups to follow a similar model. For example,
suits were filed against Germany and German companies for
their role in the Herero genocide in southwestern Africa
(sometimes called the “first” genocide of the twentieth century);
against Japan and Japanese industry arising out of the Second
World War for slave labor; against multinationals arising out of
their business activities in apartheid South Africa; and by
African-Americans for reparations against the U.S. government
and American companies involved in slavery arising from the
American slave era.36
The Getty case, which sought the return of valuable Canon
Tables that had been removed from an early medieval Armenian
illuminated book of gospels during the Armenian genocide, was
another such suit.
(discussing the history of Holocaust reparations efforts, and of U.S. government
involvement in brokering settlements).
33 America’s Role in Addressing Outstanding Holocaust Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Europe of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of
J. Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice); see also HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE
LAW, supra note 4, at 163.
34 HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 163.
35 Id. at 164.
36 For a more thorough discussion of the cases, their background, and success or lack
thereof, see id. at 169–77.
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Events that occurred in Ottoman Turkey targeting ethnic
Armenians between 1915 and approximately 1923 are often
referred to as the “Armenian genocide.” During this period,
between 1 million and 1.5 million Armenians were rounded up
with little to no notice and forcibly deported, primarily into the
eastern deserts now in the territories of Syria, Iraq, and
Kuwait.37 According to one account, “the great bulk of the
Armenian population was forcibly removed from Armenia and
Anatolia to Syria, where the vast majority was sent into the
desert to die of thirst and hunger. Large numbers of Armenians
were methodically massacred throughout the Ottoman Empire.
Women and children were abducted and horribly abused. The
entire wealth of the Armenian people was expropriated.”38
Turkey has long refused to recognize the massacres of the
Armenians as a genocide.39 At most, Turkey offers a grudging
recognition, with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu
stating in 2015, the hundred-year anniversary of the start of
the Armenian genocide, that “[w]e once again respectfully
remember Ottoman Armenians who lost their lives during the
deportation of 1915 and share the pain of their children and
grandchildren.”40 According to Turkey, the forced dislocation was
“a war-related dislocation and security measure” with unfortunate
consequences.41 As Turkey sees it, Armenian nationalists agitating
for independence presented a “security risk.”42 Because Armenians
took up arms against the Ottoman government, their relocation
was constructed to be a result of their political goals, not their

37 For a thorough discussion of whether the actus reus and mens rea of the legal
definition of genocide are met with respect to the Armenians, see id. at 61–63; see also
Complaint at 13, Bakalian v. Republic of Turkey, No. CV10-09596, 2010 WL 5390152
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010) (describing the circumstances leading up to the genocide, and the
genocide itself).
38 Frequently Asked Questions About the Armenian Genocide, ARM. NAT’L INST.,
http://www.armenian-genocide.org/genocidefaq.html [http://perma/H28G-MGMX].
39 HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 63; see also Carol J.
Williams, As Centenary of Armenian Massacre Nears, ‘Genocide’ Dispute Sharpens, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015, 7:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-armeniagenocide-anniversary-20150420-story.html (quoting Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu as stating that “to reduce everything to a single word, to load all of the
responsibility on the Turkish nation . . . and to combine this with a discourse of hatred is
legally and morally problematic”) [http://perma.cc/4BT7-2QNC].
40 Williams, supra note 39.
41 According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the Armenian deaths
were due to the effects of “inter-communal conflict” and a world war when 2.5 million
Muslims also perished. See The Armenian Allegation of Genocide: The Issue and the Facts,
REP. OF TURK. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-armenianallegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts.en.mfa [http://perma.cc/Z2V4-8B7X].
42 See Complaint, supra note 37, at 13 (noting that Armenians were one of the most
prosperous groups living in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries); HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 63.
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ethnicity or religion.43 However, British historian Donald
Bloxham has written that “nowhere else during the First World
War was the separatist nationalism of the few answered with the
total destruction of the wider ethnic community from which the
nationalists hailed.”44
Turkey’s resistance to recognition means that no political or
diplomatic solution has yet been found for the question of
compensation to Armenians for their injuries incurred during the
genocide, including property restitution. Thus, beginning in the
early 2000s, Armenian genocide victims, led by attorney Vartkes
Yeghiayan, himself a child of survivors of the Armenian genocide,
also began filing suits in U.S. courts seeking restitution for the
property takings that occurred during the Armenian genocide.45
As Yeghiayan explained in an article in the Los Angeles Times:
“For the first time [the Armenian community] has gone beyond
lamentation and liturgy to litigation, from picketing and going to
church every April 24 [the Armenian Day of Remembrance] and
mourning to taking legal action. . . . Holocaust victims’ heirs
showed me the way.”46
III. CALIFORNIA’S ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR VICTIMS
When property is taken in the context of mass human rights
abuses, violence, or genocide, courts often approach cases with
caution out of concern they are intruding into political and/or
foreign affairs realms, whether such concerns are warranted or
not. A number of doctrines provide ammunition to defendants to
put the case out of reach of the courts.
Motivated by these concerns, and by the large numbers of
potential plaintiff claimants living in California, the California
legislature began in the late 1990s to enact special statutes
designed to aid particular classes of victim groups in bringing their
claims in court. Thus began a years-long conversation between
the California legislature and the federal judiciary regarding the
HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 63.
DONALD BLOXHAM, THE GREAT GAME OF GENOCIDE 92 (2007); see also RONALD
GRIGOR SUNY, “THEY CAN LIVE IN THE DESERT BUT NOWHERE ELSE”: A HISTORY OF THE
ARMENIAN GENOCIDE (2015); ARA SARAFIAN, TALAAT PASHA’S REPORT ON THE ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE 5–8 (Ara Sarafian ed., Gomidas Inst. 2011).
45 For a description of the early years of Armenian restitution litigation efforts, see
Lamentation and Liturgy, supra note 27. The outcome of those early cases, as well as
later-filed cases, is discussed more thoroughly in Michael J. Bazyler & Rajika L. Shah,
The Unfinished Business of the Armenian Genocide: Armenian Property Restitution in
American Courts, 23 SW. J. INT’L L. 101 (2017).
46 Beverly Beyette, He Stands Up in the Name of Armenians, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27,
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/27/news/cl-56190 (quoting Armenian-American
attorney Vartkes Yeghiayan, who represented plaintiffs in Armenian genocide-era restitution
suits) (internal quotation marks omitted) [http://perma.cc/L6MZ-JCK4].
43
44
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scope of valid state action in light of the Constitution’s allocation
of the foreign affairs power to the federal government.
A. Garamendi and the Contours of Foreign Affairs Preemption
The first of these cases involved unpaid insurance policies
issued to Holocaust victims. In 1998, California enacted
amendments to its Insurance Code, requiring insurance
companies doing business in the state to publish lists of any
insurance policies issued to Europeans that were in effect
between 1920 and 1945.47 The disclosure requirements were
codified as the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (“HVIRA”).
The statute applied only to “Holocaust victims,” and, according to
the legislative history, was designed to “ensure the rapid
resolution” of unpaid insurance claims, “eliminating the further
victimization of these policyholders and their families.”48 It was
also explicitly passed as a tool to promote “the development of a
resolution to these issues.”49
The question of the constitutionality of the state statute
eventually made its way to the Supreme Court. In a 5–4 split
decision issued on June 23, 2003, Justice David Souter authored
what has become the definitive case describing the modern
doctrine of foreign affairs preemption, American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi.50
In Garamendi, the Court laid out the analytical framework
for conducting foreign affairs preemption analysis. Clarifying its
prior decision in Zschernig v. Miller51—the only prior precedent
that invalidated a state law under the foreign affairs doctrine—the
Garamendi Court explained that Zschernig embodied two
“contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption.”52 As
Garamendi explained, the Zschernig majority employed the
doctrine of field preemption to invalidate a state law whose
implementation impermissibly “intru[ded] into the field of
foreign affairs.”53 By contrast, Justice Harlan, who concurred in
the result, declined to embrace the notion of field preemption in

47 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 408–09 (2003) (describing CAL.
INS. CODE § 13800 et seq. (West 1999). California also amended its Code of Civil Procedure
to extend the statute of limitations on any such claims until December 31, 2010, see CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.5 (West 2006), but the district court’s ruling dismissing the challenge
to that statute for lack of standing was not on appeal. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409 n.4.
48 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 410 (quoting a California Senate Committee on Insurance
report).
49 Id. at 410–11 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 13801(f) (West 1999)).
50 See generally id.
51 See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
52 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419.
53 Id. at 417 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432).
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foreign affairs, but agreed that the state law could be preempted
on a narrower rationale, due to “conflicting federal policy.”54 As
the Garamendi Court emphasized, this narrower reading of the
foreign affairs preemption doctrine stemmed from a desire to
avoid conflict with precedent “suggesting that in the absence of
positive federal action ‘the States may legislate in areas of their
traditional competence even though their statutes may have an
incidental effect on foreign relations.’”55
The Garamendi Court noted that there was “a fair question
whether respect for the executive foreign relations power
requires a categorical choice between the contrasting theories of
field and conflict preemption evident in the Zschernig opinions.”56
Garamendi, however, “require[d] no answer” to that question, for
the state statute before the Court—California’s HVIRA—involved
“a sufficiently clear conflict to require finding preemption” even
on the narrower view of foreign affairs preemption espoused by
Justice Harlan in Zschernig.57 Having found that HVIRA
conflicted with federal policy to settle Holocaust insurance claims
exclusively through the German Foundation “Remembrance,
Responsibility and the Future” negotiated by President Bill
Clinton and funded by the German government,58 the Court
found no need to consider whether, in the absence of either an
express federal preemption or a conflict with federal foreign
policy, a state law such as HVIRA could be held invalid because
it intruded into the “field” of foreign policy occupied by the
federal government.59
In dicta, the Garamendi Court indicated that the foreign
affairs doctrine retained the concept of implied field preemption,
which could be deployed in a narrow set of circumstances:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy
with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state
responsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine,
whether the National Government had acted and, if it had, without
reference to the degree of any conflict . . . Where, however, a State has
acted within what Justice Harlan called its “traditional competence,”
but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might make good sense to
require a conflict, of a clarity and substantiality that would vary with
the strength or the traditional importance of the state concern asserted.60

54 Id. at 418–19 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at
458–59).
55 Id. at 418 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459).
56 Id. at 419 (footnote omitted).
57 Id. at 419–20.
58 Id. at 405.
59 Id. at 419–20.
60 Id. at 419 n.11 (citations omitted).
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Moreover, “congressional occupation of the field is not to be
presumed ‘in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.’”61
Thus, Garamendi struck down HVIRA as being in conflict
with the federal policy establishing a forum and mechanism to
resolve unpaid Holocaust insurance claims, and set the stage for
successive litigation.62
B. The Wartime Claims Statute
Also in 1999, California passed a statute extending the
limitations period for certain claims arising out of World War II.
Section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provided a
right of action in state courts for Second World War “slave
labor” and “forced labor” victims or their heirs, and established
that such claims would be timely if brought prior to December
31, 2010.63 The statute defined “slave labor victims” as those
taken from a concentration camp or ghetto between 1929 and
1945 by the Nazis or their allies or business enterprises in
Nazi-controlled territories, to perform unpaid labor, while
“forced labor victims” were civilians and prisoners of war who
labored under the same conditions.64 The value of the compensation
that the statute entitled them to seek was to be calculated
without regard to any wartime or post-war currency
devaluations65—a significant requirement given that many
eastern bloc communist countries devalued their currencies one
or more times in the post-war period.
Plaintiffs filed twenty-nine suits in California for
compensation from German and Japanese companies who
benefitted from their labor during the war. The cases were
consolidated and removed to federal court. The named plaintiff in
the individual lead case, Deutsch v. Turner, was a Hungarian
Jew sent to Auschwitz with his brothers, where they were forced
to work fourteen-hour days, seven days a week, for a German
construction company.66 The other cases involved claims against
Japanese companies.

Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Ironically, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had not found HVIRA to
be unconstitutional for precisely the opposite reasons, holding that it did not violate the
dormant commerce clause and was unlikely to intrude on the federal foreign affairs power
because Congress acquiesced in its passage. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am.
v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 745–48 (9th Cir. 2001).
63 See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (1999)).
64 Id. at 706 (quoting CIV. PROC. § 354.6(a)(1),(2)).
65 Id. at 706–07 (quoting CIV. PROC. § 354.6(a)(3)).
66 Id. at 704.
61
62
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Although Deutsch predated Garamendi by a few months, it
was resolved on the same basis—foreign affairs preemption. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, with Judge Stephen Reinhardt
writing the opinion, first declined to find that section 354.6 was
merely procedural, as urged by California, because it explicitly
created a cause of action for the defined victim groups.67 This
mattered because “the California legislature created—or at least
resurrected—a special class of tort actions, with the aim of
rectifying wartime wrongs committed by our enemies or by
parties operating under our enemies’ protection.”68 More
importantly, the statute implicated the federal government’s
foreign affairs power to “make and resolve war, including the
power to establish the procedure for resolving war claims.”69
According to the court, this was part of the “inner core” of the
otherwise somewhat vaguely defined foreign affairs power, and
was thus reserved exclusively to the federal government.70
Relying on Zschernig, the court struck down section 354.6 as
unconstitutional.71 Plaintiffs’ claims were thus subject to
California’s existing statutes of limitation of general
applicability, under which they were all time-barred.72
C. The Holocaust Art Statute
In 2002, before the opinions in either Deutsch or Garamendi
had been issued, California acted again. This time the legislature
amended the Code of Civil Procedure to add section 354.3, which
allowed “any owner, or heir or beneficiary of an owner, of
Holocaust-era artwork” to bring an action in California courts
against “any museum or gallery that displays, exhibits, or sells
any article of historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic
significance,” and extended the statute of limitations until
December 31, 2010.73
Marei von Saher was the surviving heir of a prominent
Jewish art dealer living in the Netherlands before World War
II.74 The family fled when war broke out and left all their assets
behind, including art dealer Jacques Goudstikker’s collection of
over 1000 artworks, which was looted by the Nazis.75 However,
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 716–17.
See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena (Von Saher I), 592
F.3d 954, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2010) (amended opinion) (discussing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3).
74 Id. at 959.
75 Id.
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
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Jacques did bring his notebook containing a list of each of the
paintings; it noted that Goudstikker’s collection included the
“Adam and Eve” diptych by Cranach the Elder.76
Shortly after the war ended, the United States adopted a
policy of “external restitution,” whereby Nazi-looted artworks
found by U.S. forces would be returned to the country of origin so
that each country could establish its own means of restituting
artworks to the original owners.77 Thus, after Allied forces
discovered the Cranachs at Hermann Göring’s country estate
outside Berlin, they returned the paintings to the Netherlands.78
The Netherlands awarded the Cranachs to another claimant,
who traced the paintings to his family from takings effected by
the Soviet Union prior to the war, and who sold them to the
Norton Simon Museum in Pasadena, California, in the 1970s.79
After the passage of section 354.3, in 2007, von Saher
brought suit against the Norton Simon to recover the Cranachs.
By the time the case reached the Ninth Circuit on the question of
the constitutionality of section 354.3, the court had the benefit of
the opinions in both Garamendi and Deutsch. The court did not
fail to notice that this was another instance of California taking
action to assist Holocaust-era claimants.80
In an opinion authored by Judge Thompson and joined by
Judge Nelson, to which Judge Pregerson dissented, the court
reviewed the principles set forth in Garamendi regarding foreign
affairs conflict and field preemption (“Von Saher I”). The court
held that section 354.3 did not conflict with any existing federal
policy; moreover, the 1943 London Declaration (in which the
Allies reserved the right to invalidate any wartime transfers of
property) did not expressly address restitution or reparations,
and a policy statement issued by President Truman immediately
following the war (setting forth the operating procedures under
which the policy of “external restitution” would take place)
ceased to have effect in 1948, when the U.S. stopped accepting
external restitution claims.81
The court went on to find, however, that section 354.3 was
invalid under the doctrine of field preemption. Although
regulation of property was traditionally an area of state
responsibility, section 354.3 “[could not] be fairly categorized as a

76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id. at 957–58.
Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 961–63.
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garden variety property regulation” because it singled out a
particular group of victims and claims (art recovery claims of
Holocaust victims and their heirs).82 Thus, the statute’s real
purpose was to benefit this particular group.83 Moreover,
although California had a legitimate interest in regulating
museums and galleries operating within the state, section 354.3
applied to “any” museum or gallery, whether located in
California or not—an expression of dissatisfaction with the
federal government’s resolution of World War II that belied any
“serious claim” that it addressed an area of traditional state
responsibility.84 Further, as in Deutsch, the statute impermissibly
established a remedy for wartime injuries, as particularly evidenced
by the statute’s repeated references to the “Nazi regime,” “Nazi
persecution,” and “atrocities” committed by the Nazis.85 The
statute would have more than an incidental effect on foreign
affairs because it would require courts to review the restitution
policies and decisions made by foreign countries following the
war, i.e. the Netherlands’ internal policies concerning restitution
of stolen artworks recovered by the Allies for distribution to the
rightful claimants.86
Thus, section 354.3 was struck down in its entirety. As in
Deutsch, von Saher’s claims did not meet California’s general
statute of limitations applicable to claims for property theft—the
existing version of Code of Civil Procedure section 338—and thus
the claims were time-barred.87
However, as further discussed infra, the California
legislature was not ready to give up on its attempts to provide
redress and a friendly forum for claimants. Six weeks after the
Ninth Circuit issued its 2010 decision in Von Saher I, the
California legislature amended section 338 to add new section
338(c)(3).88 Section 338(c)(3) was made explicitly retroactive so
that it could apply to von Saher’s claims.89
Id. at 964.
Id.
Id. at 965 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003)).
Id. at 966.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 968–69.
See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena (Von Saher II), 754
F.3d 712, 718 (9th Cir. 2014).
89 Id. at 719. Thus, Marie von Saher’s quest to recover the Cranachs continued for
several more years, and still continues today—ten years after the case was first brought.
By 2014, the question of whether von Saher’s specific claims and remedies, rather than
amended section 338(c)(3), conflicted with the federal government’s “external restitution”
policy and were therefore preempted was before the Ninth Circuit for the first time. Id.
The panel (consisting of Judges Nelson, Pregerson, and Wardlaw, Judge Thompson
having since passed away) again rejected the museum’s conflict preemption argument,
this time “because the Cranachs were never subject to postwar internal restitution
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
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The constitutionality of section 338(c)(3) under foreign
affairs field preemption was eventually addressed in another
case, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Foundation Collection,90 as
discussed infra. In the meantime, California faced continued
judicial scrutiny regarding a series of Armenian genocide-related
recovery statutes.
D. The Armenian Genocide Insurance Statute
Taking direct inspiration from suits brought by Holocaust
survivors and heirs against European insurance companies that
failed to pay out on life insurance and other policies purchased by
European Jews prior to the Second World War, Armenian
claimants brought several suits in federal court in Los Angeles
against American and European insurance companies that failed
to pay on policies purchased seventy or more years earlier by
Armenians in Ottoman Turkey prior to the Armenian genocide.
A specific statute passed by the California legislature in
2000, and codified at California Code of Civil Procedure section
354.4, established California as a forum for “any Armenian
Genocide victim” or an heir or beneficiary residing in the state to
bring claims “arising out of an insurance policy or policies
purchased or in effect in Europe or Asia between 1875 and 1923,”
despite any forum-selection clause in the contracts, and extended
the limitations period for filing the cases.91 An “Armenian
Genocide victim” was defined as “any person of Armenian or
other ancestry living in the Ottoman Empire during the period of
1915 to 1923, inclusive, who died, was deported, or escaped to
avoid persecution during that period.”92 Section 354.4 was
explicitly modeled after the California statutes at issue in
Garamendi and Deutsch.93
The first two lawsuits, against New York Life Insurance
Company and French insurer AXA, closely followed the
proceedings in the Netherlands”: Jacques Goudstikker’s immediate heirs had never made
postwar restitution claims for the Cranachs to the Dutch government, because the
Netherlands had determined (remarkably, in the court’s view) that Göring had obtained
them without duress. Id. at 721–22. The museum eventually obtained summary judgment
on all of plaintiff’s claims on August 9, 2016, on the basis that the Norton Simon acquired
good title to the Cranachs through the Dutch state. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 10, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
No. CV 07-2866 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016). Von Saher appealed the judgment to the Ninth
Circuit, with written briefing scheduled for spring 2017. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon
Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 16-56308 (9th Cir. 2016).
90 Cassirer v. Thyssen–Bornemisza Collection Found., 737 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2013).
91 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(b), (c) (West 2006).
92 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(a) (West 2006).
93 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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Holocaust restitution litigation model. In 2004, New York Life
settled for $20 million. 94 In 2005, AXA likewise settled for $17
million.95 Settlement funds were established in both cases,
administered by a three-person settlement board with authority to
review and decide on claims, under the supervision of the
federal judges hearing the cases, to pay out the valid insurance
claims. The remainder of the funds was to be distributed in cy
pres funds to various American and French Armenian nonprofit groups. 96
In the third insurance case, Movsesian v. Victoria
Versicherung AG, the Armenian claimants made similar claims
against German insurers.97 However, that case followed a
different and most unusual trajectory. In addition to the
technical arguments made in the other suits such as statute of
limitations, forum non conveniens and the like, the German
defendants in Movsesian argued that section 354.4 was
unconstitutional. As in Deutsch, defendants argued that the
California statute impermissibly intruded on the federal
government’s conduct of foreign affairs, and was therefore
preempted.98 In particular, they argued that the statute was
intended to benefit a particular class of victims—“Armenian
Genocide victims”—and objected to the statute’s definition of
“Armenian Genocide victim.”99 The district court rejected the
argument, and defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The appellate court issued a split 2–1 decision in 2009
reversing the district court and holding for the defendants. In an
opinion authored by Judge Thompson and joined by Judge
Nelson, from which Judge Pregerson dissented—i.e. the same
panel and the same configuration that held section 354.3 to be
field preempted in Von Saher I—the court held that section 354.4
conflicted with an express federal policy to avoid recognizing an
“Armenian Genocide.”100 Although the House of Representatives
regularly introduced measures to formally recognize the events
targeting Armenians and other ethnic and religious minorities in
94 See Armenian Heirs Settle AXA Class Action Lawsuit, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 12,
2005, 11:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20051012005262/en/ArmenianHeirs-Settle-AXA-Class-Action-Lawsuit [http://perma.cc/7YPG-GMZV].
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055. In addition to Victoria Versicherung AG,
plaintiffs also named as defendants Victoria’s parent owner, Munchener
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG (“Munich Re”), and another
Munich Re subsidiary, Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG (“Ergo”). All three defendants are
referred to collectively as “Victoria Insurance.”
98 See id. at 1055.
99 See id. at 1054–55.
100 Id. at 1057.
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Ottoman Turkey as a genocide, the court pointed to executive
efforts to prevent the measures from coming to a House vote, and
letters to Congress from the State Department that such
resolutions would “complicate our efforts to bring peace and
stability to the Caucasus and hamper ongoing attempts to bring
about Turkish-Armenian reconciliation,” as evidence of clear
executive policy.101 The court noted that “the heart” of the conflict
lay in the two-word phrase “Armenian Genocide”: “The symbolic
effect of the words . . . is precisely the problem. The federal
government has made a conscious decision not to apply the
politically charged label of ‘genocide’ to the deaths of these
Armenians during World War I.”102 The court also found that
California’s interest in passing section 354.4 was not, as
plaintiffs claimed, in carrying out its traditional role of
regulating insurers, but rather the “real desiderata” was to
provide a forum for Armenian genocide victims to obtain
justice.103 Because the federal policy had preemptive force and
section 354.4 was in conflict with the policy, the court struck
down the statute.104
Due to the importance of the issues at stake, Plaintiffs
sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. After more than a
year, the same three-judge panel issued a new decision in 2010
granting the petition for rehearing, withdrawing the original
2009 decision, and filing a new opinion and dissent.105 This time,
Judge Pregerson wrote the majority opinion joined by Judge
Nelson, and Judge Thompson was in the dissent. Evidently,
Judge Pregerson had persuaded Judge Nelson that, in fact,
there was no express federal policy against use of the term
“Armenian Genocide,” and therefore section 354.4 should be
allowed to stand.106
In the second Movsesian decision, the court held that
“informal presidential communications” to Congress suggesting
that the House decline to formally recognize the Armenian
genocide were not sufficient to establish a federal policy against
recognition, particularly in light of other executive and legislative
statements favoring such recognition.107 The court pointed to
regular congressional remembrance day celebrations in honor of
genocide victims, including Armenians; executive statements

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 1057–59; see also Lamentation and Liturgy, supra note 27, at 260–61.
Id. at 1060–61.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1062 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003)).
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 903.
Id. at 906.
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regarding the events using language “virtually indistinguishable”
from “Armenian Genocide”; and statements by then-presidential
candidate Barack Obama urging recognition of an Armenian
genocide.108 Nor had the federal government previously expressed
any opposition to the large number of states that individually
recognized the Armenian genocide.109 In the absence of a clear
federal policy, section 354.4 presented no conflict and was
therefore not preempted on that basis.110
The court further held that section 354.4 did not conflict with
either the German-American claims agreement signed in 1922 to
settle all claims of U.S. nationals against Germany or German
nationals arising out of World War I, or the 1928 Settlement of
War Claims Act providing for payment of awards made under the
claims agreement, because section 354.4 covered private
insurance claims and was not an invalid exercise of the federal
government’s power to wage and end war.111
Moreover, the doctrine of field preemption did not apply,
because California was validly acting within its traditional state
interest in regulating the insurance field and was not, as the
original panel decision had held, simply using the statute as a
means of impermissibly taking a position on foreign affairs.112
For these reasons, the court now found that section 354.4 was a
valid exercise of state power and was not preempted.113
The legal saga in Movsesian, however, did not end there. In
December 2011, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc. In
February 2012, the en banc panel, in a decision issued by Judge
Susan Graber, found that section 354.4 was preempted because it
“intrude[d] on the field of foreign affairs without addressing a
traditional state responsibility.”114 In other words, the en banc
panel held that the doctrine of field preemption, which it also
termed “dormant foreign affairs preemption,” applied to make
section 354.4 unconstitutional.115 This was a new direction for the
court in Movsesian, which in its previous two decisions had
focused almost exclusively on conflict preemption and the
existence, or not, of an express federal policy with which section
354.4 conflicted.

Id. at 906–07.
Id. at 907.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 907–08.
Id. at 909.
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067, 1072
(9th Cir. 2012).
115 Id. at 1072 (quoting Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 709 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003)).
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
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Field preemption is a powerful doctrine, because it may
apply regardless of whether the federal government has taken
any action at all; or, if it has, regardless of whether the state
action at issue was in any conflict.116 Its purpose is to ensure that
the states do not engage in foreign affairs policy, even if the
federal government has not acted.117
The en banc court relied on Zschernig to illustrate its point.
Zschernig struck down an Oregon probate statute providing that
nonresident aliens could not inherit property in Oregon (it would
escheat to the state) unless they could prove that the country in
which they resided granted reciprocal rights to U.S. citizens.118
Although the statute purported to be a traditional exercise of
state power over property and inheritance rights, the Supreme
Court determined that it would require Oregon state courts to
engage in a detailed inquiry into foreign political systems and the
nature of foreign property rights, including whether such rights
were granted on an equal basis or based on governmental caprice
and whether state confiscation of property was an important
feature.119 This being the height of the Cold War, the Supreme
Court concluded that the real purpose of the statute was to take
a particular foreign policy position and make value judgments
regarding certain countries’ approaches to property distribution
in order to “keep United States money out of the grasp of
communist or authoritarian nations.”120 Thus, even though the
federal government had not established any policy that conflicted
with Oregon’s statute, the statute was nevertheless preempted
because it would necessarily require judges to make determinations
that would intrude into the field of foreign affairs.121 The en banc
court also examined Von Saher I, its most recent field preemption
case, decided two years earlier.122
With these precedents in hand, the Movsesian en banc court
turned to section 354.4. According to the court, the real concern
with the California statute was that it did the same thing as the
unconstitutional statutes in Zschernig and Von Saher: it
provided a particular remedy for a particular class of people for
the purpose of righting what California had determined was a
historical wrong, namely, the persecution of Armenians at the
hands of the Ottoman Turks.123 Such a goal fell outside the scope
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11.
Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1072.
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430–31 (1968); Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1072.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433–34; Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1072–73.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437–38 n.8; Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1073.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440; Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1073.
Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1071.
Id. at 1075–76.
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of traditional state responsibility.124 The statute, according to the
en banc panel, also had more than an incidental effect on foreign
affairs, because it “expresse[d] a distinct political point of view on
a specific matter of foreign policy” by labeling the events at issue
a “genocide” and displayed sympathy for “Armenian Genocide
victims.”125 Finally, the court was concerned that, in order to
determine whether a particular claimant qualified as an
“Armenian Genocide victim” according to the statute’s definition,
a judge would have to make a politicized inquiry into the
sensitive question of whether the policyholder had “escaped to
avoid persecution” by the Ottoman Turks.126 For these reasons,
the court held section 354.4 to be unconstitutional under the
doctrine of field preemption.127
Given the sweeping nature of the court’s decision that any
state action promoting use of the term “Armenian genocide” was
preempted, the Movsesian plaintiffs sought review by the
Supreme Court and filed a petition for writ of certiorari. In light
of the federal government interests at stake, the Supreme Court
invited the Solicitor General to submit the views of the United
States government. The government was unequivocal: section
354.4 impermissibly intruded on federal foreign affairs powers,
the en banc panel had reached the correct decision, and there
Id. at 1076.
Id. It did not escape the court’s notice that, only a few days after the en banc oral
argument was held, France and Turkey became embroiled in a diplomatic row after the
French National Assembly passed a bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian genocide,
much as Holocaust denial is also a crime in France. Turkey recalled its ambassador,
canceled bilateral visits, and refused cooperation in certain areas. Id. at 1077 (citing a
BBC news article from December 22, 2011, detailing the developments, see Turkey
retaliates over French ‘genocide’ bill, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-16306376 [http://perma.cc/LX67-JBDN]). Turkey took similar actions when
the German Bundestag voted in June 2016 to declare the killings of Armenians in
Ottoman Turkey a genocide. See German MPs recognise Armenian 'genocide' amid
Turkish fury, BBC NEWS (June 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe36433114 [http://perma.cc/RQ6N-9TS9]. Perhaps even more concerning for the court was
the fear of angering Turkey, an important NATO ally, at a time of increasing tension in
the Middle East. Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077 (citing a New York Times article
describing President Obama’s reluctance to use the term “Armenian Genocide” during a
remembrance day celebration due to Turkey’s fierce opposition, see Peter Baker, Obama
Marks the Genocide Without Saying the Word (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
04/25/world/europe/25prexy.html). The “Arab Spring” had already begun by the time of
the en banc oral argument, with demonstrations and protests in Tunisia that spread to
several surrounding countries and eventually led to the downfall of multiple regimes. One
of NATO’s most important strategic airbases is located in Incirlik, Turkey, and continues
to play a pivotal role in combating terrorism, providing support to Syrian rebels, and
fighting the spread of the Islamic State (“ISIS”). These events lend support to the court’s
conclusion that the question of whether a genocide occurred in Ottoman Turkey
“continues to be a hotly contested matter of foreign policy” and that “Turkey expresses
great concern over the issue.” Id.
126 Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1076–77.
127 Id. at 1077.
124
125
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was no need for further review by the Supreme Court.128 The
government also suggested that, while there was no express
conflict between section 354.4 and certain treaties and
settlement agreements concluded between the United States and
Turkey after World War I to settle claims of U.S. nationals, the
existence of such documents demonstrated that the U.S. adopted
a particular approach to the settlement of wartime claims—an
approach with which California expressed dissatisfaction in the
passage of section 354.4.129 Indeed, the government indicated
that its consistent policy response when faced with questions
such as those presented by the Movsesian plaintiffs’ claims was
to encourage Turkey and Armenia together to reach a mutually
agreeable solution.130
The petition for certiorari was denied, and thus the en
banc decision stands as the final word on the Movsesian
plaintiffs’ claims. 131
E. The Armenian Genocide Bank Deposit Statute
In 2006, Armenian claimants filed a new suit against two
German banks, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, seeking to
recover money and property allegedly withheld by these
defendants during the Armenian genocide from their Armenian
depositors.132 The German banks were accused of trading in
assets stolen from the Armenian victims by the Ottoman Turkish
state perpetrators.133 The complaint in the action recited the
historical facts of the murder and deportation of the Armenian
128 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5–6, Arzoumanian v. Munchener
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S.Ct. 2795 (2013) [hereinafter
Solicitor General’s Brief]. The case name changed on petition for writ of certiorari as only
certain plaintiffs elected to proceed with claims against certain defendants.
129 Id. at 15.
130 Id. at 17.
131 It appears that Movsesian III is likely to remain limited to clarifying the
circumstances in which a state steps too far over the line reserving foreign affairs powers
to the federal government. See Gingery v. City of Glendale, 831 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir.
Aug. 4, 2016) (declining to extend Movsesian III’s preemption holding to action by the city
of Glendale in erecting a monument to Korean “comfort women” who served as sexual
partners to Japanese soldiers during World War II). Unlike Movsesian, in Gingery the
local government had appropriately addressed its views “through expressive displays or
events, rather than through remedies or regulations.” Id. at 1229. The court confirmed
that “Glendale's establishment of a public monument to advocate against ‘violations of
human rights’ is well within the traditional responsibilities of state and local
governments.” Id. Further, even if the city was acting outside an area of traditional state
responsibility, its action of erecting a monument memorializing victims and expressing
the hope that others would not experience similar harms would not have more than an
incidental or indirect effect on foreign affairs, and thus was not preempted. Id. at 1231.
132 See Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G. (Deirmenjian I), No. 06-cv-00774 MMM
(CWx), 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96772 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006).
133 See id. at *2–3. Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank (Deirmenjian III), A.G., No. 06-cv00774 MMM (CWx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *2, *21–23 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010).
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population of Ottoman Turkey, including the death of 1.5 million to
2 million Armenians between 1915 and 1923, and sought recovery
for the theft of the victims’ property.134
Deirmenjian involved two plaintiff subclasses. Class A
consisted of those whose ancestors had deposited assets directly
with the defendant banks.135 The complaint alleged that the
Armenian minority in Ottoman Turkey relied on the stability of
the European banks and, therefore, deposited assets in such
banks for their protection.136 The two German banks, operating
in Ottoman Turkey under the name of Deutsche Orient Bank,
allegedly had over a dozen branches throughout the Ottoman
Empire and targeted affluent Armenians as their customers.137
Class B consisted of those victims whose assets were looted
pursuant to Turkish government action and later deposited with
the defendant banks.138 With the onset of the killings and
deportations of Armenians, the German banks allegedly accepted
gold deposits from the Ottoman Turkish government with full
knowledge that such deposits were taken from the Armenian
victims.139 Moreover, the German banks allegedly transferred to
their own books assets belonging to their deceased Armenian
customers rather than returning those assets to the customers’
heirs, and they deliberately concealed the existence of the assets
from such heirs.140
The Class A plaintiffs relied on California Code of Civil
Procedure section 348, a general purpose statute on the books
since the late 1800s, which provides that there is no limitations
period on actions to recover money or other property deposited
with a bank.141 The Class B looted asset plaintiffs, however, could
not rely on section 348, and in her initial decision issued in

See id. at *5–11.
See id. at *2–3 n.2.
First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 7,
Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., No. 06-cv-00774 MMM (CWx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
2006) [hereinafter Deirmenjian First Amended Complaint].
137 Id. at 5. Similar allegations were made by Jews against the Swiss banks. See
MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S
COURTS 43, 52 (N.Y.U. Press, 2003).
138 See Deirmenjian I, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96772, at *3 n.2.
139 Deirmenjian First Amended Complaint, supra note 136, at 9–10; cf. BAZYLER,
supra note 137, at 26 (explaining that in the Holocaust restitution litigation, both Swiss
banks and German banks were accused of knowingly accepting from the Nazis gold and
other assets looted from the Jews).
140 Deirmenjian First Amended Complaint, supra note 136, at 10.
141 See Deirmenjian I, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96772, at *121, 133; see also CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 348 (West 2006).
134
135
136
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September 2006, presiding Judge Margaret Morrow142 dismissed
the Class B claims as time-barred, with leave to amend.143
The California legislature acted swiftly, and on January 1,
2007, California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.45 came into
effect. Section 354.45 extended the statute of limitations for
claims brought by “Armenian Genocide victims” for the return of
deposited assets or looted assets later deposited in a bank
operating in Ottoman Turkey during the genocide—categories
that reflected the two plaintiff subclasses in Deirmenjian.144 The
definition of “Armenian Genocide victim” in section 354.45 was
identical to that found in section 354.4, the statute struck down
in Movsesian III.145
In a lengthy decision issued in December 2007 (prior to the
Movsesian I and Von Saher I rulings, but after Deutsch and
Garamendi), the district court held that section 354.45 was
unconstitutional. 146 According to Judge Morrow, the new
California law impermissibly intruded on the foreign affairs
power of the federal government to settle wartime claims of
American citizens against Turkey and Germany arising out of
World War I.147 The court analyzed the Treaty of Berlin and a
subsequent executive agreement between the United States and
Germany establishing a mixed claims commission to consider
war reparations to be paid to U.S. nationals, and determined that
section 354.45 conflicted with both.148 Additionally, the court held
that section 354.45 conflicted with the Ankara Agreement, a
1934 agreement between the United States and Turkey
memorializing and establishing a $1.3 million lump-sum
payment for all claims of U.S. nationals against Turkey that fell
within the scope of a prior agreement between the parties.149
Judge Morrow has since retired from the federal bench.
Deirmenjian I, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96772, at *121, 150.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.45; see also S.B. 1524, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006)
(explaining section 354.45’s connection with the Armenian genocide). The statute provides
as follows:
Any action, including any pending action brought by an Armenian Genocide
victim, or the heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, who resides
in this state, seeking payment for, or the return of, deposited assets, or the
return of looted assets, shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the
applicable statute of limitation, if the action is filed on or before December 31,
2016.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.45(c).
145 Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.45(a)(1) with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(a)(1).
146 Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G. (Deirmenjian II), 526 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1085
(C.D. Cal. 2007). The Class B plaintiffs thus could not rely on section 354.45 either, and
their claims were finally dismissed in 2008.
147 Id. at 1079–80.
148 Id. at 1081–85.
149 Id. at 1085.
142
143
144
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The question of whether section 354.45 actually conflicts
with the Ankara Agreement settlement is controversial, because
there is ample evidence that the claims commission established
pursuant to the Ankara Agreement did not consider claims of
“naturalized” American citizens—i.e. Turkish Armenians—at
Turkey’s insistence.150 Ultimately, however, it did not matter,
because in a 2010 decision granting defendants summary
judgment over all the Class A claims, the court held that—in
contrast to its initial 2006 decision finding the Class A claims
timely under section 348—the ten-year Turkish statute of repose
applied to bar the claims.151
Shortly thereafter, one of the plaintiffs, Khachik Berian
(both on his own behalf and on behalf of the similarly situated
class plaintiffs), filed an appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals seeking to have the lower court’s ruling that the Turkish
limitations period applied to Armenian genocide-era claims
overturned and section 354.45 found valid.152 Written briefing
concluded in May 2011, but oral argument was not scheduled
until November 2013. During that time, two developments
occurred that impacted the issues on appeal in Deirmenjian.
First, the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc field preemption
opinion in Movsesian III striking down section 354.4. Second, the
United States filed its wide-ranging amicus brief to the Supreme
Court regarding the Movsesian plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari
and setting forth its expansive view of federal policy regarding
use of the term “Armenian genocide.” In an unpublished
Memorandum Opinion issued December 9, 2013, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in Deirmenjian on statute of limitations grounds.153
Thus, by the end of 2013, California’s repeated legislative
attempts to provide a forum for its Jewish and Armenian
residents seemed to be going nowhere, as the courts consistently
deferred to the federal government and struck down every statute.

150 See Opening Brief of Appellant Khachik Berian, Berian [Deirmenjian] v. Deutsche
Bank, A.G., No. 10-56359, at 33–34 and accompanying references (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2011);
see also Lamentation and Liturgy, supra note 27, at 277–79 (describing correspondence in
the treaty’s travaux préparatoires between the United States and Turkey in which the
United States acquiesced to Turkey’s request to exclude claims of Turkish Armenians).
151 Deirmenjian III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *77.
152 See Berian [Deirmenjian] v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., No. 10-56359 (9th Cir. Nov. 5,
2013). No Class B plaintiff (representing the looted assets claims) filed an appeal, and
Defendant Dresdner Bank was not a party on appeal.
153 See Memorandum Opinion, Berian [Deirmenjian] v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., No. 1056359 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2013).
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IV. CALIFORNIA’S LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE REDRESS
BEAR FRUIT
A. Section 338(c)(3), the General Purpose Art Recovery Statute
Undaunted by the federal courts’ consistent findings that
California’s special statutes were unconstitutional, and apparently
determined to learn from their prior mistakes, in September
2010 California lawmakers signed into law new section 338(c)(3)
of the Code of Civil Procedure, adding the provisions to the
existing section 338.
Unlike the other statutes that came before it, section
338(c)(3) did not limit itself to a particular class of plaintiffs with
claims that arose in particular historical circumstances. Rather,
it applied generally to the recovery of fine art taken by theft.154
The statute provides in relevant part that:
[A]n action for the specific recovery of a work of fine art brought
against a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer, in the case of an
unlawful taking or theft, as described in Section 484 of the Penal
Code, of a work of fine art, including a taking or theft by means of
fraud or duress, shall be commenced within six years of the actual
discovery by the claimant or his or her agent, of both of the following:
(i) The identity and the whereabouts of the work of fine art. In the
case where there is a possibility of misidentification of the object of
fine art in question, the identity can be satisfied by the identification
of facts sufficient to determine that the work of fine art is likely to be
the work of fine art that was unlawfully taken or stolen.
(ii) Information or facts that are sufficient to indicate that the
claimant has a claim for a possessory interest in the work of fine art
that was unlawfully taken or stolen.155

According to the legislative history, the purposes of the
statute were twofold. First, the legislature wanted to “clarify
competing interpretations of California’s statute of limitations for
the specific recovery of personal property.”156 Second, the bill was
designed to “address a vexing problem faced by theft victims”: the
fact that it is “in the very nature of stolen art that it circulates
underground for several years before it appears in museums and
galleries, and by that time the SOL has long run its course.”157
The legislature thus recognized, as several courts already had, that

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3)(A) (West 2010).
Id.
Statute of Limitation: Recovery of Stolen Works of Art, Hearing on A.B. 2765
Before the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 3 (Cal. 2010) (Assembly Bill-Bill Analysis),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?bill_number=ab_2765&sess=0910&house=A.
157 Id. at 3–4.
154
155
156
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a “discovery” rule would be fairer to victims of art theft, even while
acknowledging the “potential inequity” to good faith purchasers.158
Although section 338(c)(3) was thus clearly passed for
neutral reasons having nothing to do with the Holocaust,
Armenian genocide victims, or any other select victim group,
there is some evidence that California legislators remained
interested in formulating a pro-victim statute that did not
implicate foreign affairs. For example, the legislative history also
referred to Von Saher I, noting that, in striking down section
354.4, the Ninth Circuit indicated that von Saher potentially
could have brought her claims under the general provisions of
section 338, but that the court was uncertain as to whether the
discovery rule announced in unrelated California case law would
apply to the circumstances of von Saher’s case.159 In addition, E.
Randoll Schoenberg, the attorney representing Maria Altmann in
her quest to recover her family’s Nazi-stolen artwork from
Austria,160 also wrote in support of the amendment.
As with the other statutes, the constitutionality of section
338(c)(3) would soon be tested.
B. The Western Prelacy Files Suit Against the J. Paul Getty
Museum
In 2010, a few months prior to the passage of section
338(c)(3), Attorney Vartkes Yeghiayan filed another Armenian
genocide-era case, this time on behalf of the Western Prelacy of
the Armenian Apostolic Church of America. The lawsuit,
originally filed by the Western Prelacy in June 2010 in the Los
Angeles Superior Court, named as defendants the J. Paul Getty
Museum and the J. Paul Getty Trust—one of the wealthiest and
most prominent art institutions in the world.161 The complaint
accused the Getty defendants of purchasing art which was stolen
from the rightful owner, the Catholicosate of Cilicia, during the
gravest days of the Armenian genocide, 1915–1923.162 The
complaint was amended in 2011 to add plaintiff’s reliance on
section 338(c)(3).163

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 7.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Veronica Rocha, Armenian Church Sues the Getty, L.A. TIMES (June 3,
2010), http://www.latimes.com/gnp-church060310-story.html [http://perma.cc/282P-TD6Z].
162 See id.
163 See Second Amended Complaint, Western Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic
Church of America v. The J. Paul Getty Museum, Superior Court for the State of
California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 438824 (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Getty
Complaint].
158
159
160
161
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The One Holy Universal Apostolic Orthodox Armenian
Church is the official name of the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox
Church (the “Armenian Church”), and is the oldest organized
Christian Church in the world, having its origins in 301 A.D.,
when Armenia adopted Christianity as its official religion.164 It
remains the central religious authority for the Orthodox
Armenian population all over the world.165 The Catholicosate of
the Holy See of the Great House of Cilicia is one of the Church’s
two main regional sees.166
During the Armenian genocide, the Catholicosate of Cilicia,
which was located in Sis (a medieval Armenian city in
modern-day Kozan, Turkey), was robbed and ruined by the
Turks.167 Catholicos Sahak, having been warned that Sis would
be subject to the same kind of massacres experienced in other
parts of the Ottoman Empire, retreated with his followers to
Aleppo, Syria.168 In 1929, following the exodus of hundreds of
thousands of Armenians from Turkey, the Catholicosate was
reestablished in Antelias, Lebanon.169 This became the new home
of the Great House of Cilicia in the Armenian diaspora.170
Following the genocide and the growth of the Armenian
diaspora in the United States, the Catholicosate of Cilicia came
to be represented in the United States by independently
functioning Eastern and Western Prelacies.171 The Western
Prelacy is headquartered in southern California.172
The facts of the Western Prelacy’s complaint tell a story that
could have come right out of a Hollywood film. It begins 800
years ago with T’oros Roslin (circa 1210–1270), the most
prominent Armenian manuscript illuminator in the High Middle
Ages.173 The works of Roslin occupy the most significant place in
the book painting of the Cilician state and Medieval Armenia.174
His art is discussed in numerous scholarly books and articles in
multiple languages, and his name is mentioned in various
publications concerning both the history and culture of Armenia

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
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and art history in general.175 Roslin’s works are preserved in
manuscripts held in collections all over the world.176
The Zeyt’un Gospels were copied and illustrated by Roslin in
Hromkla, Cilicia, in 1256 for Catholicos Constantine I of the Holy
See of the Great House of Cilicia.177 Like other religious
illuminated manuscripts, they constitute a highly valued national
treasure of the Armenian people.178 According to legend, religious
manuscripts like the Zeyt’un Gospels wielded supernatural powers
that would protect and save all those associated with its creation
and protection.179 For over six centuries, the Zeyt’un Gospels were
venerated by the Armenians of Zeyt’un, Turkey, especially during
times of war.180 During the critical days of the Armenian
genocide, the full Church hierarchy in procession paraded the
Zeyt’un Gospels through every street in Zeyt’un in order to create
a divine firewall of protection around the city.181
By the late nineteenth century, the Gospels were in joint
possession of the church and the Sourenian family, a prominent
Turkish Armenian family known as “Defenders of the Church.”182
The Gospels were placed in an iron chest in the wall of the
Church in Zeyt’un and secured by two locks.183 The Church had
the key to one of the locks and the Sourenian family had the key
to the other.184 The Gospels could only be “freed” by the insertion
of both keys at once.185
In or about 1915, at the start of the Armenian genocide, the
Zeyt’un Gospels were taken from the Church in Zeyt’un
and handed to Prince Asadur Agha Sourenian, who, because of
his prominent family connections with the Turks, was among the
last to leave Zeyt’un when all Armenians were ordered exiled.186
Prince Asadur and his family were not deported until late
1915.187 Prior to their deportation, the prince brought the Gospel
book to the nearby town of Marash in order to save it from
certain destruction, and also to be protected by its divine
power.188 In the spring of 1916, the Sourenian family, which was
175
176
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continuing to safeguard the Zeyt’un Gospels in Marash, was
ordered exiled to Der Zor in the Syrian Desert.189
Also in Marash with the Sourenians was their friend and
doctor, Dr. H. Der Ghazarian, who was working at the time in a
German hospital.190 He discovered the Sourenians were going to
be deported and asked to borrow the Zeyt’un Gospels the day
before they were exiled.191 Dr. Der Ghazarian’s ardent requests to
borrow the Gospels ultimately saved it.192 Because of his work at
the hospital, the doctor was allowed to stay in Marash longer
than most other exiled Armenians.193
With the Sourenian family exiled to the desert, the Gospel
book remained temporarily with Dr. Der Ghazarian in Marash.194
It is believed that Dr. Der Ghazarian and his family fled Marash
in the spring of 1920 and were forced to leave behind the
Gospels.195 Subsequently, an unknown Turkish individual found
the Zeyt’un Gospels and brought the manuscript to Melkon
Atamian, an Armenian, in Marash for him to sell.196 Atamian
apparently cut away eight folios (sixteen pages) bearing the eight
illuminated Canon Tables—some of the most beautiful pages in the
Gospels—and returned the rest of the manuscript to the Turk.197
The Turkish possessor subsequently took the Gospel
manuscript, minus the eight folios, to Khachatur vardapet Der
Ghazarian, Prelate of the Armenian Church of Marash, part of
the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia.198 Der Ghazarian,
before his own deportation, entrusted the Gospels to Reverend
James K. Lyman—an American missionary in Marash.199 Later,
Rev. Lyman sent word from Marash to the “Zeyt’un Compatriotic
Union” in Aleppo that he was in possession of the Gospel book
and was prepared to transfer it to them for safekeeping.200 With
the consent of the Patriarch of Marash, Lyman was told to pass it
on to the Patriarchate of the Armenian Church in Istanbul.201
In the late 1960s, with the consent of the Catholicosate of the
Great House of Cilicia, the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, in an
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effort to prevent the Turkish government from sequestering
sacred church objects, took the Gospel book to Armenia.202 The
Gospel book, minus the eight folios containing the Canon Tables,
was then presented to the Matenadaran—the Armenian state
museum located in Yerevan, and the main repository for
Armenian manuscripts—for preservation.203 The Zeyt’un Gospels
remain at the Matenadaran to the present day.204
Unbeknownst to the Catholicosate of the Great House of
Cilicia, the eight stolen folios containing the Canon Tables were
maintained in the private collections of the Atamian family for a
period of over ninety years, from the time of removal to the time
of the Getty’s purchase in 1994.205 During this time, the
Catholicosate had no knowledge of facts to suggest that the pages
had been stolen during the Armenian genocide.206 Armenian
Church-related scholars, including those associated with the
Catholicosate, who had studied both the Zeyt’un Gospels and the
eight folios comprising the Canon Tables during the decades
since their separation, could not definitively conclude that the
Canon Table pages had been stolen from the Zeyt’un Gospels.207
In 1994, the Atamian family loaned the folios to the Pierpont
Morgan Library in New York for an exhibition entitled, “Treasures
From Heaven.”208 The Atamian family’s name remained
anonymous at the time of the exhibition.209 The Catholicosate
was never informed by the family of either their possession or the
initial removal of the eight missing Canon Tables.210 The
Pierpont Morgan Library also never informed the Catholicosate
of Cilicia of their temporary possession of the stolen folios.211
Sometime after the Pierpont Morgan exhibition, the Getty
Museum purchased the eight stolen folios (Canon Tables) from
the Atamian family.212
The Catholicosate did not discover that the eight missing
folios of the Zeyt’un Gospels had in fact been stolen and were
being housed in the Getty Museum in Los Angeles until about
July 2006.213 Following this discovery, the Western Prelacy, as
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the authorized representative and assignee of the Catholicosate
of the Great House of Cilicia, brought suit.
C. Section 338(c)(3) Is Upheld
As with so many other lawsuits seeking compensation and
restitution for injuries incurred as a result of mass atrocities, the
timeliness of the Western Prelacy’s claims was a heavily litigated
issue from the outset.
In the Getty’s 2011 demurrer214 to the operative complaint,
the Getty argued that the Church’s claims were time-barred
under either the general limitations period found in section 338
or the newly passed section 338(c)(3).215 In November 2011, the
court overruled the Getty’s demurrer, rejecting the Getty’s
assertions that early dismissal was appropriate based upon
statutes of limitations, including section 338(c)(3).216 The court
then ordered the parties to participate in mediation.217
Developments in the Holocaust looted art cases soon began
to have an impact on the litigation against the Getty. In October
2012, the Western Prelacy and the Getty museum asked the court
to stay the case in light of the recent federal district court ruling in
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation—a case
against a Spanish state-run art museum brought by the heir to a
Holocaust survivor whose valuable artwork had been stolen by
the Nazis—declaring section 338(c)(3) to be unconstitutional.218
The district court relied in part on the fact that section 338(c)(3)
applied to claims to art taken after 1910, as evidence that the
legislative intent was—as with the other California statutes
previously struck down—to provide a forum for Holocaust-era
claims in particular.219 The district court’s decision was on appeal
to the Ninth Circuit, and thus the resolution of the appeal could
determine the outcome of the Western Prelacy’s case.
214 A demurrer is California’s procedure for challenging the sufficiency of the
complaint, analogous to a 12(b)(6) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
215 See Defendants the J. Paul Getty Museum and the J. Paul Getty Trust’s (1) Notice
of Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint; (2) General Demurrer to Second Amended
Complaint; and (3) Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 5–15, Superior Court of the
State of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 438824 (filed Sept. 6, 2011).
216 The court ruled from the bench and did not issue a written opinion. For a
discussion of the November 3, 2011 demurrer hearing, see Mike Boehm, The Getty
Museum is in a Legal Fight Over Armenian Bible Pages, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/04/entertainment/la-et-armenian-bible-20111104
[http://perma.cc/28JL-33GV].
217 See id.
218 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 737 F.3d 613 (9th Cir.
2013). The Cassirer case had originally been brought pursuant to California’s section
354.3, the Holocaust art recovery statute that was later struck down in the Von Saher I
case. Von Saher I, 592 F.3d 954 at 616–17.
219 Id. at 619.
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The Ninth Circuit issued its ruling in Cassirer in December
2013. In a major victory for plaintiffs’ advocates, the court220 held
that—unlike the state statutes at issue in Garamendi, Deutsch,
Von Saher, Movsesian, and Deirmenjian—section 338(c)(3) was
not preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine.221 According to
the Ninth Circuit, section 338(c)(3) “does not create a remedy for
wartime injuries by creating a new cause of action for the
recovery of artwork”; rather, it “extends the statute of limitations
for preexisting claims concerning a class of artwork that is
unrelated to foreign affairs on its face.”222 The court noted that
section 338(c)(3) was neutral on its face and said nothing about
wartime injuries or claims.223 The statute did not limit the class
of claimants only to “Holocaust” or “Armenian Genocide” victims,
but rather any person could recover any work of fine art as long
as the statute’s other requirements were met.224 The panel
emphasized the facial neutrality of the statute, a result of what
Judge Nelson referred to at oral argument as the desirable and
intended interplay between the judicial and legislative
branches as separate and co-equal branches of government. 225
Indeed, the facial differences between section 338(c)(3) and its
unconstitutional predecessors were signs that the California
legislature had taken heed of the court’s concerns and taken steps
to remedy them. In its decision, the Ninth Circuit specifically cited
the Getty case as an example of a non-Holocaust-era case relying
on the statute for recovery.226
Following the Ninth Circuit’s February 2014 denial of the
Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation’s petition for
rehearing en banc in Cassirer, the state court lifted the stay in
the Getty case so that proceedings and discovery could
recommence. Trial was scheduled to begin on November 3, 2015.
On September 21, 2015, in the year marking the hundredth
anniversary of the start of the Armenian genocide, the Western
Prelacy and the Getty museum announced in a joint press
release that they had resolved their dispute over the ownership
of the eight Canon Tables.227 In the settlement, the Getty
220 The Cassirer panel consisted of Judges Pregerson, Nelson, and Wardlaw. Judge
Pregerson wrote the unanimous opinion. See id. at 614.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 618–19.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 619.
225 The author attended oral argument in Cassirer at the Ninth Circuit in Pasadena,
California on August 22, 2013.
226 Cassirer, 737 F.3d at 619. The court also cited Rafaelli v. Getty Images, Inc., No.
2:12–cv–00563 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) (suit regarding photographs created in the 1970s).
227 Press Release, J. Paul Getty Museum and the Western Prelacy of the Armenian
Apostolic Church of America Announce Agreement in Armenian Art Restitution Case,
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“acknowledges the Armenian Apostolic Church’s ownership of the
eight thirteenth century manuscript pages. . . . Separately, in
recognition of the Getty’s decades-long stewardship of the Canon
Tables and its deep understanding and appreciation of Armenian
art, the Church will donate the pages to the Getty Museum in
order to ensure their preservation and widespread exhibition.”228
The Canon Tables will continue to be housed at the Getty
museum and will be available to museum visitors as well as
scholars and researchers.229
V. THE WAY FORWARD?
As the first successful settlement of an Armenian genocide-era
art case, the Western Prelacy’s suit against the Getty may point
the way towards the future of Armenian genocide litigation.
Dozens of other Armenian manuscripts are known to exist in
museum collections across the United States, including the
Huntington Library and Art Gallery in San Marino, California;
the Walters Art Gallery in Baltimore, Maryland; the Museum of
Fine Arts in Boston, Massachusetts; the Pierpont Morgan Library
in New York; the Philadelphia Museum of Art in Pennsylvania;
and the Freer Gallery of Art at the Smithsonian in Washington.230
However, whether those states have, or would pass, statutes
of limitations similar to section 338(c)(3) is unknown. If they do
not, Armenian and other plaintiffs seeking the return of artworks
and cultural objects taken in circumstances involving mass
atrocities may be more likely to find their claims time-barred
outside of California. In crafting a creative and amicable
settlement that offered both sides something of what they
wanted, the Getty case may offer lessons for others—beneficiaries
of section 338(c)(3) or not—to continue moving forward.
Victims of Holocaust-era art theft have additional reason for
optimism. On December 16, 2016, President Obama signed into
law the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (the
“HEAR Act”).231 In Senate hearings on the proposed bill, actress
Helen Mirren—who played successful plaintiff Maria Altmann in
GETTY (Sept. 21, 2015), http://news.getty.edu/press-materials/press-releases/canon-table2015.print [http://perma.cc/M8DR-9ND9].
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Melissa Conway & Lisa Fagin Davis, Directory of Collections in the
United States and Canada with Pre-1600 Manuscript Holdings, 109 PAPERS
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOC'Y AMERICA 273, 301, 357, 387 (2015).
231 See President Obama Signs Law to Aid Recovery of Nazi-Looted Art, PR
NEWSWIRE (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/president-obamasigns-law-to-aid-recovery-of-nazi-looted-art-300381587.html [http://perma.cc/S6AW-3FBX]; see
also Pub. L. 114-308, 114th Cong., H.R. 6130 (Dec. 16, 2016).
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the 2015 movie “Woman in Gold,” about Altmann’s quest to
recover several valuable Klimt paintings taken from her Jewish
family in Vienna during World War II—testified in favor of the
bill, along with Ronald Lauder, the head of the World Jewish
Congress and a Holocaust victim’s heir who has been fighting for
twenty years to recover art belonging to his grandfather.232
Introduced with bipartisan support in early 2016, the bill passed
both the House and Senate unanimously.233
The HEAR Act is “the latest step” in the United States’
efforts, in place since World War II, to “help restore artwork and
other cultural property lost in the Holocaust to its rightful
owners.”234 As the accompanying Senate report noted, the first
step in those efforts was the immediate postwar policy of
“external restitution” discussed in the Von Saher case.235
However, that policy was not always successful in reuniting the
true owners with their art.236
By the early part of the twenty-first century, the United
States had taken a number of additional actions in furtherance of
its overall policy of restitution, including (i) participation in the
1998 Washington Conference, at which forty-three nations
declared Principles encouraging Holocaust victims and their
heirs to come forward and make claims for unrestituted art;
(ii) passage of the 1998 Holocaust Victims Redress Act and
U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, also encouraging
restitution of stolen art; and (iii) signing the 2009 Terezin
Declaration, urging forty-eight signatory states to ensure that
their legal systems facilitate “just and fair solutions” and resolve
claims regarding Nazi-confiscated and looted art in a fair and
expeditious manner.237
In 1999, the Alliance of American Museums also adopted
non-binding Standards Regarding the Unlawful Appropriation of
Objects During the Nazi Era, which urged members to identify
objects in their collections that may have been stolen by the
Nazis, make provenance information accessible, and continue
their provenance research efforts.238
232 See Halimah Abdullah, Helen Mirren, Lawmakers Push to Recover Art Stolen by
Nazis, NBC NEWS (June 7, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/helen-mirrenlawmakers-push-recover-art-stolen-nazis-n587311 [http://perma.cc/U6RQ-9Q99].
233 See President Obama Signs Law to Aid Recovery of Nazi-Looted Art, supra note
231; see also HEAR Act Signed Into Law, COMMISSION FOR ART RECOVERY,
http://www.commartrecovery.org/hear-act [http://perma.cc/2GRG-ZWVA].
234 S. Rep. 114-394, 114th Cong., at 2 (Dec. 6, 2016).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 3–4.
238 Id.; see also Standards Regarding the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During
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Against this background, however, Congress recognized that
“‘many obstacles [still] face those who attempt to recover
Holocaust-era art through lawsuits,’ including ‘procedural
hurdles such as statutes of limitations’ that prevent the merits of
claims from being adjudicated.”239 For this reason, “[a] Federal
limitations period . . . is therefore needed to guarantee that the
United States fulfills the promises it has made.”240
The purposes of the HEAR Act are twofold: “(1) To ensure
that laws governing claims to Nazi-confiscated art further United
States policy as set forth in the Washington Conference
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims
Redress Act, and the Terezin Declaration”; and “(2) To ensure
that claims to artwork and other property stolen or
misappropriated by the Nazis are not unfairly barred by statutes
of limitations but are resolved in a just and fair manner.”241
Congressional action in passing the HEAR Act is therefore
grounded in its power to conduct foreign affairs; this of course
avoids the constitutional problems inherent in so many of
California’s state statutes and provides the justification for
Congress’ regulation of the limitations period on claims to certain
private property—action which federal courts have found is a
traditional state interest.242
The main provision of the Act is modeled on the text of
section 338(c)(3) and reads as follows:
a) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or
State law or any defense at law relating to the passage of time, and
except as otherwise provided in this section, a civil claim or cause of
action against a defendant to recover any artwork or other property
that was lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution
may be commenced not later than 6 years after the actual discovery by
the claimant or the agent of the claimant of—
(1) the identity and location of the artwork or other property; and
(2) a possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork or other
property.243

The italicized portions of the above text are very similar to
the relevant portions of section 338(c)(3).244 The HEAR Act also
the Nazi Era, AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethicsstandards-and-best-practices/collections-stewardship/objects-during-the-nazi-era [http://
perma.cc/9SUM-QVAL].
239 S. Rep. 114-394, 114th Cong., at 5 (Dec. 6, 2016) (quoting Von Saher I, 592 F.3d at
958 (some internal formatting omitted)).
240 Id.
241 S. 2763, 114th Cong. § 3 (Apr. 4, 2016) (as amended Sept. 29, 2016).
242 See, e.g., Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 908.
243 Pub. L. 114-308 at § 5(a) (emphasis added).
244 Compare Pub. L. 114-308 at § 5(a) (Apr. 4, 2016) (as amended Sept. 29, 2016) with
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contains similar guidance as to when and how to resolve possible
claims of misidentification.245 The Act would apply to any claims
pending at the time of enactment or filed from the date of
enactment through December 31, 2026.246
The enacted version of the HEAR Act differs in important
ways from the bill as originally drafted. The enacted bill contains
an expanded and more detailed definition of “artwork or other
property,” which now includes not only fine art such as paintings,
sculpture, drawings, and the like, but also “musical objects and
manuscripts (including musical manuscripts and sheets), and
sound, photographic, and cinematographic archives and
mediums.”247 Ceremonial and sacred objects are also included.248
However, the Act also contains an exception for claims already
barred on the date of enactment if the claimant or a predecessorin-interest already had actual knowledge of the relevant facts for
at least six years from January 1, 1999 onwards and could have
brought a claim.249
VI. CONCLUSION
The Getty case sits at the unique intersection of Armenian
genocide property restitution efforts and California’s search for a
constitutionally permissible way to provide a forum for its victim
residents. Given the previous several years of litigation in which
California statutes regarding claims of Holocaust and Armenian
genocide survivors were consistently struck down on foreign
affairs preemption grounds, it would not have been surprising if
section 338(c)(3) had suffered the same fate.
That this did not happen is down to the core constitutional
principle of separation of powers between co-equal branches of
government. After years of hearing from courts that the
California legislature impermissibly infringed on the federal
conduct of foreign affairs, the state found a way forward by
passing a statute, section 338(c)(3), that is neutral on its face and
thus generally applicable to art recovery in atrocities other than
the Holocaust—or even to art recovery having nothing to do with
any mass abuses. This solution would not exist if California had
not persisted in attempting to provide meaningful assistance to
hundreds of thousands of its residents.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3)(A).
245 Compare Pub. L. 114-308 at § 5(b) (Apr. 4, 2016) (as amended Sept. 29, 2016) with
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3)(A)(i).
246 See Pub. L. 114-308 at § 5(d) (Apr. 4, 2016) (as amended Sept. 29, 2016).
247 See Pub. L. 114-308 at § 4(2) (Apr. 4, 2016) (as amended Sept. 29, 2016).
248 See id.
249 Id. at § 5(e).
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Section 338(c)(3) strikes a careful balance between the needs
of plaintiffs and the concerns of defendants. The value of an
“actual discovery” rule to begin the running of the statute of
limitations is amply demonstrated by the complicated and
confusing history of the Zeyt’un Gospels: the Western Prelacy
was not even aware of the existence of the Canon Tables, much
less the location and how the pages came to be at their present
location, until decades after they were stolen. Museums,
galleries, and art dealers cannot acquire good title from a thief,
and they have an obligation to look carefully into the provenance
of any artworks they purchase and abide by ethical acquisition
standards. They are also entitled to uniform application of the
laws, and to expect that states will not override foreign policy
decisions of the federal government.
Section 338(c)(3) also provided the template for Congress to
take action. The HEAR Act is now in place, and can serve as a
model for future legislation at the federal level. Though the road
to this point was long, the future for human rights plaintiffs
remains bright.
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